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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE PRACTICAL AND
PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF JURY MISCONDUCT IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
In the American legal system, one of the most fundamental rights of
all individuals is the right to a jury trial.' The jury system has become a
central feature in the American system ofjustice and is a revered symbol of
the American way of life.2 In a civil proceeding, the Seventh Amendment
provides and protects a party's right to a jury trial, while in a criminal
proceeding, Article III, section 2, clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment pro-
vide a defendant right's to ajury trial.3 Congress has also extended this
1. 9 CHARLEs A. WIG-rr & ARTHUR R. MI1LIER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2301 (1971). The right to a jury trial has ancient origins. Id. Blackstone
believed that the right to a jury trial was the glory of English law and the most
transcendent privilege. Id. It is now believed that this right is a healthy and vital
Anglo-American legal right. 1 HON. EDWARD J. DEvrrr & CHARLEs B. BLACKmAR,
FEDERALJURY PRACnCE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 1.01 (3d ed. 1987). SeeWinebrenner v.
United States, 147 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir.) (discussing Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments to Constitution entitling persons to jury trial), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 863
(1945). See generally Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (discussing obli-
gation of trial court to preserve right to jury trial); Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Effi-
ciency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process-The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U.
CIN. L. REv. 15, 15 (1990) (discussing role ofjury trial in American legal system);
Peter N. Thompson, Challenge to the Decisionmaking Process-Federal Rule of Evidence
606(B) and the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 Sw. L.J. 1187, 1189-95 (1985)
(discussing history and evolution of jury).
2. Thompson, supra note 1, at 1188.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment in pertinent part states:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by ajury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the right to a jury trial in civil cases as "a
basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence." Jacob v.
New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942). In civil proceedings, the jury brings the
common wisdom of the community when considering the outcome of the private
dispute. Brodin, supra note 1, at 16.
When a distinction existed between common law courts and the courts of eq-
uity, and even after they merged, civil jury trials were only offered to persons whose
cases would have been categorized as common law suits. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 1, at § 2302. Therefore, if a case, historically, would have been tried in a
court of equity, it was tried without a jury. Id. Now statutes extend the right to ajury trial to include both cases that would have historically been tried in common
law courts and equity courts. Id. See DEvrrT & BLActMAR, supra note 1, at § 1.01
(discussing both civil and criminal right to jury trial); Pamela J. Stephens, Control-
ling the Civil Juy: Towards a Functional Model of Justification, 76 Ky. LJ. 81, 86-94
(1987) (discussing development of civil jury trial stating guarantee to civil jury trial
left out of Constitution due to disagreement on precise content of guarantee, and
(1005)
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right to other areas not mandated by the Constitution.4 Further, the fed-
eral procedural rules recognize and govern this right in both civil and
criminal proceedings.5
Inherent in the constitutional right to a jury trial is the require-
ment of fairness and impartiality.6 The Supreme Court, in Irvin v.
noting failure was corrected in Bill of Rights which preserved right to jury trial
according to rules of common law).
Article III, § 2, cl. 3 provides:
The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury;
and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall
be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed .... U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
In criminal cases, the jury operates as the accused's safeguard against arbitrary
law enforcement, corrupt or overzealous prosecutors and biased or eccentric
judges. Brodin, supra note 1, at 15. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970)
(holding purpose ofjury trial to prevent government oppression); Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (recognizing trial by jury in criminal proceedings is
fundamental and is incorporated into due process of Fourteenth Amendment);
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (discussing purpose of jury trial in
criminal proceedings to protect accused from prosecutor and judge); see also,
Charles Monk, Control of the Jury, 75 GEo. LJ. 1070, 1070 (1987) (discussing Sixth
Amendment rights of accused).
4. Divri-r & BLACMAR, supra note 1, at § 1.01. There are now rights to ajury
trial in certain admiralty matters, certain actions on bonds and in certain tax cases.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1988) (protecting right to jury trial in admiralty matters);
28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988) (protecting right to jury trial in certain tax cases).
5. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at § 2318. The right to a jury trial in civil
litigation is protected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 provides in relevant part "the right of trial by
jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution or as given by
statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." FED. . CIv.
P. 38(a); see DEvrrr & BLACXMAR, supra note 1, at § 1.01 (discussing procedure for
demanding civil jury trial); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at § 2318 (same).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure generally protect the jury trial right
of the accused. In particular, Criminal Rule 23 states that "cases required to be
tried by jury shall be so tried." FED. R. CRiM. P. 23(a). See DEvrrr & BLACKMAR,
supra note 1, at § 1.01 (discussing federal statutory protection ofjury trial in crimi-
nal cases).
6. U.S. CONST. amend XI. Even though the Constitution mandates an impar-
tial jury for criminal proceedings, civil parties have the same right to fair and unbi-
ased juries. Emily M. DeFalla, Voir Dire for California's Civil Trials: Applying the
Williams Standard, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 517, 524 (1988); see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
722 (1961) (stating right to jury trial guarantees fair trial by panel of impartial,
indifferent jurors); Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1988) (recog-
nizing Sixth Amendment guarantee to trial by impartial jury), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1071 (1989); United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1144 (6th Cir. 1985)
(recognizing Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury ensures fair trial by panel of
impartial jurors), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119 (1986); Winebrenner v. United States,
147 F.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir.) (quoting Judge Love in Pool v. Chicago B. & 0. R.
Co., 6 F. 844, 850 (1881) "there is no right more sacred than right to fair trial"),
1006 [Vol. 39: p. 1005
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Dowd,7 defined the standard for an impartial jury stating that "[i] t is not
required that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved....
[I]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and
render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court."8 This stan-
dard developed because diverse and widespread methods of communica-
tion, now often make it impossible to obtain a jury that has been isolated
from a case, especially a case that catches the public's interest. 9 Because
great concern exists about how to procure and maintain an impartial jury,
courts and legislatures have implemented various procedures and rules.10
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 863 (1945); Monk, supra note 3, at 1070 (discussing right of
accused to panel of impartial jurors).
7. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
8. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 722-23. The petitioner was arrested and confessed to six
murders. Id. at 717. There was both extensive media coverage of the murders as
well as the petitioner's confession. Id. The petitioner sought a change of venue,
which was denied. Id. As a result, eight jurors were selected, each admitting that
they thought the petitioner was guilty, but indicated that despite their opinion,
they could render an impartial verdict. Id. After setting fort the standard for
impartial jurors, the court vacated and remanded the case because of juror bias.
Id. at 729.
Importantly, the Court also noted that ajuror's statement about the ability to
render an impartial verdict is not dispositive. Id. It remains the view today that
obtaining a completely impartial jury is impractical (e.g. a jury with no knowledge
about the case or the issues at all). DEvrrr & BLAcKmAR, supra note 1, at § 4.02.
Trial lawyers also agree as to the difficulty of getting an impartial jury. DeFalla,
supra note 6, at 517. Their concern is not only about common knowledge of the
case, but about the opinions and attitudes that jurors bring with them into the
courtroom. Id.; see United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1970)
(recognizing complete sanitizing ofjury room is impossible), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
922 (1971).
9. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 729.
10. DeFalla, supra note 6, at 518. Concern over jury prejudice has persevered
since the time of Lord Coke. Id. at n.4. It is even more pronounced now that the
nature of the litigation allows the jurors an opportunity to apply their own atti-
tudes and opinions on policy when rendering a verdict. Id. at 519. A further worry
is that in 'big' or technical cases, the jury's ability to comprehend and recall the
evidence at trial, as well as a judge's instructions on how to apply the law to the
evidence, may be inadequate and therefore prejudice the parties. Brodin, supra
note 1, at 18.
Other concerns about protecting a party from jury prejudice are noted in the
rules that have been developed governing jury trials. The first rule is the Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988). It applies to both
criminal and civil cases, and ensures that jurors are selected from a fair cross sec-
tion of the community. Id. See DEVrrr & BLAcK, supra note 1, at § 2.20 (discussing
history and background of Jury Selection and Service Act); WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 1, at § 2481 (same).
Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure are the second type of rules affording parties a trial
by qualified and impartial juries. WRIGr & MILER, supra note 1, at § 2482. Both
rules give the court broad discretion in conducting voir dire and examining pro-
spective jurors. Id. Judges can conduct the voir dire themselves and allow counsel
to submit questions or allow counsel to conduct the examination. Id.; see United
States v. Bryant, 471 F.2d 1040, 1044 (1972) (refusing to hold court must permit
counsel to voir dire), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1112 (1973); James v. Continental Ins.
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Juror misconduct, both during the trial and during jury deliberation,
often constitutes a violation of a person's right to an impartial jury." Ju-
ror misconduct occurs when members of the jury have, in some way, not
performed in the appropriate fashion. 12 Juror misconduct affects the im-
partiality of decision-making because the jury has considered evidence
other than that presented to them in open court.' 3 To determine
Co., 424 F.2d 1064, 1065 (3d Cir. 1970) (granting broad discretion to trial judge
concerning manner of voir dire, type of questions and scope); DEvrrT & BACMAR,
supra note 1, at § 3.01 (discussing examination of prospective jurors).
Counsel's right to challenge the placement of the juror is also another proce-
dural safeguard for procuring an impartial jury. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). Each
party has the right to challenge for favor in selecting individual jurors. BLAcKmAR
& DEvrrr, supra note 1, at § 3.02. A juror is challenged for favor if on questioning
there is some evidence of actual or implied bias. Id.
Once the jury has been selected, other implemented safeguards help maintain
jury fairness. The first safeguard is the judge's admonition to the jury. Id. at
§ 5.08. The judge should admonish the jury not to communicate among them-
selves or with others about any subject of the case, and not to form opinions con-
cerning the case until all evidence has been submitted. Id. Admonitions are
important because they advise the jury on their function, how they are to perform
and how they should conduct themselves. Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d
322, 328 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 863 (1945).
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(B) also provides a means of protecting the im-
partiality of the jurors. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at § 6071. The rule states
that a juror may not testify about whether extraneous prejudicial information or
outside influence was improperly considered by the jury during deliberations. Id.;
see Edward T. Swaine, Pre-Deliberations Juror Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence, and
Juror Responsibility, 98 YALE LJ. 187 (1988) (applying Rule 606(B) to matters and
statements occurring before deliberations); Thompson, supra note 1, at 1187 (dis-
cussing jurors inability to impeach their verdict).
11. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). The conduct and
deliberations of the jury should be without improper influences. Id.; see Drew v.
Collins, 964 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1992) (alleging jury misconduct occurred
when jury considered parole law during capital sentencing deliberations), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 3044 (1993); United States v. Tierney, 947 F.2d 854, 868 (8th Cir.
1991) (alleging juror misconduct occurred when juror slept and read magazines
during trial); United States v. Anello, 765 F.2d 253, 258 (1st Cir.) (alleging juror
misconduct occurred when one juror made remark to another before delibera-
tions), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 996 (1985); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 783
(2d Cir.) (allegingjuror misconduct occurred when extra-record evidence consid-
ered in deliberations), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985); United States v. Reynolds,
346 F.2d 253, 254 (7th Cir.) (alleging juror misconduct when jurors read article
about defendant during trial), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965).
12. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at § 2810. Allegations of juror miscon-
duct involve situations where jurors have communicated with counsel, witnesses or
parties. DEvrrr & BLACKMAR, supra note 1, at § 5.16. Other instances of juror
misconduct include consideration by the jury of matters off the record, communi-
cations between third persons and juror about a material issue in the case and
pressures and partiality on the part of the court. Honorable Dennis Edwards, Jr., A
Judge's Review ofJuror Misconduct, 27 How. LJ. 1519, 1522 (1984). For other exam-
ples of juror misconduct, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
13. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976). The Sixth Amendment guarantees the
right to an impartial jury, the right to confront a witness and the assistance of
counsel. Id. If the jury considers evidence not introduced by the court, confronta-
4
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whether the jurors' misconduct violated the party's right to an impartial
jury, the court must ascertain whether such misconduct prejudiced the
jurors' verdict. 14
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reviewed how trial courts handle jury misconduct allegations arising dur-
ing trial. Part II of this Casebrief discusses the factors commonly applied
and distinguished in jury misconduct cases. 15 Additionally, Part II
presents the Third Circuit's consideration and treatment of these fac-
tors. 16 Part III of the Casebrief discusses three significant Third Circuit
decisions utilizing these factors. 17 The Third Circuit held that trial courts
faced with allegations of juror misconduct must thoroughly examine the
extent and nature of the juror misconduct before rendering a decision on
tion and counsel rights are both violated. Id. The jury's impartiality may likewise
be compromised. Id. at 151.
14. United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
835 (1974). The appellate court noted the trial court was correct in stating that
the only question was whether the conduct prejudiced the rights to a fair trial by
an impartial jury. See United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 442 (1st Cir.
1993) (discussing requirement that trial courts must determine whether incident
occurred and whether it was prejudicial), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994);
United States v. Harris, 908 F.2d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing court's re-
sponsibility to determine whether misconduct was prejudicial), cert.denied, 498 U.S.
1093 (1991); Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 746 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating critical
question was whether the jurors unrestrained contact with the public was prejudi-
cial), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1071 (1989); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dow-
ling, 814 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding court must evaluate potential
prejudice to defendant); United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1144 (6th
Cir. 1985) (holding court must determine whether misconduct violated Sixth
Amendment), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119 (1986); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d
777, 783 (2d Cir.) (stating trial court should assess possibility of prejudice),
cert.denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985);Jackson v. Amaral, 729 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1984)
(stating conviction reversed only if exposure of jurors to outside information was
so prejudicial that it was impossible to hold a fair trial); United States v. Clapps,
732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.) (holding court must conduct voir dire to correct
potential prejudice), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085 (1984); United States v. Pantone,
609 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding voir dire to determine whether publicity
prejudiced defendant); United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1978)
(discussing importance of questioning jury to determine if they are impartial);
United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1025 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating court must
conduct investigation to determine occurrence of jury misconduct and possibility
of prejudice), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1971); Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d
727, 734 (7th Cir.) (discussing that court must determine whether jurors were ex-
posed to prejudicial publicity), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969). See generally
United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 1991) (deciding that assur-
ing right to impartial jury during jury selection is trial judge's responsibility
through use of voir dire).
15. For a further discussion and list of these factors, see infra notes 20-76 and
accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion on the Third Circuit's treatment of these factors,
see infra notes 32-39, 52-64, 67-71 and accompanying text.
17. For further discussion of recent Third Circuit decisions, see infra notes 77-
143 and accompanying text.
5
Walthall: Constitutional Law - The Practical and Procedural Implications of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
ViLLANOVA LAW REVIEW
whether the conduct prejudicial to the litigants occurred.18 The final sec-
tion presents specific ideas a lawyer in the Third Circuit may find useful
when faced with the possibility of juror misconduct mid-trial. 19
II. FACTORS TO CONSIDER INJURY MISCONDUCT CASES
The appellate courts that discuss jury misconduct that creates a level
of prejudice warranting a new trial, focus on and discuss four different
issues. The first issue concerned the influence on the jury caused by an
extraneous source or by intrajury influence.2 0 The second issue was
whether the courts allowed for a presumption of prejudice or whether the
party alleging the prejudice had the burden of proving that jury miscon-
duct caused the prejudice.2 1 The third issue focused on the trial court's
discretion in cases where jury misconduct was alleged.2 2 Finally, the
fourth issue revolved around the appellate court's standard of review. 23
A. Extraneous or Intra-Jury Influence
When rendering a verdict,jurors must consider only the evidence for-
mally presented in court.24 Nevertheless, during the course of the trial,
18. In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, the Third Circuit stated
that it would grant a new trial when juror misconduct was alleged and the trial
court failed to question and collect sufficient information to determine whether
there was juror prejudice. 814 F.2d 134, 134 (3d Cir. 1987). For a thorough dis-
cussion of Dowling, see supra notes 79-95 and accompanying text. The Third Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Resko, held that a new trial would be granted without the
defendant first establishing actual prejudice, when the trial court fails to create a
record from which the appellate court could determine whether prejudice existed
or not. 3 F.3d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 1993). For a discussion of the facts and rationale
of the Resko court, see supra notes 97-123 and accompanying text. In Waldorf v.
Shuta, the Third Circuit held that a new trial was warranted both in civil and crimi-
nal cases when the trial court conducted an inadequate investigation of the alleged
juror misconduct. 3 F.3d 705, 711 (3d Cir. 1993). For a discussion of Waldorf see
supra notes 124-44 and accompanying text. These three cases taken together set
forth a procedure that the district court is required to follow when juror prejudice
is alleged in order to avoid the automatic granting of a new trial by the appellate
court.
19. For a discussion of practitioner points, see infra notes 145-48 and accom-
panying text.
20. For definitions and further discussion of intra-jury and extra-jury influ-
ences, see infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the role prejudice plays in jury misconduct
cases, see infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the trial court's discretion as to the nature and
extent of the investigation and to whether prejudice actually occurred, see infra
notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of appellate court review of a trial court's use of
discretion, see infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
24. DEvrrr & BLAcKMAR, supra note 1, at § 5.03. In order to protect an ac-
cused's Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury, confrontation of witnesses
and the assistance of counsel, the jury can only consider evidence properly
presented to it in court. Id. Jurors should make decisions solely on the basis of
evidence offered in open court so that alljudicial safeguards are present. United
1010 [Vol. 39: p. 1005
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jurors sometimes receive two other types of information: extraneous infor-
mation and intra-jury information. 25 Extraneous influences include the
following: media and publicity coverage of the case that the jury may read
or see, consideration by the jury of extra-record facts about the case and
communications with third parties about a material issue in the case.
26
States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922
(1971); see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (emphasizing verdict be
based only on evidence presented in trial in light of extensive pretrial publicity);
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (requiring that jury verdict be based
upon evidence developed at trial because concept that verdict be based only on
evidence presented at trial is fundamental idea that is embraced in constitutional
concept of trial by jury); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (requiring verdict
be based on evidence developed at trial); United States v. Wiesner, 789 F.2d 1264,
1268 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing fundamental principle that jury verdict be based
on information acquired formally in court).
When jurors consider evidence not introduced in court, Sixth Amendment
rights are violated. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966); see United States
v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 196 (1st Cir. 1978) (noting fundamental due process rights
require that verdict be based only on evidence received in open court); Govern-
ment of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding
that rights of accused are violated when jurors consider outside evidence); Patter-
son v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (same).
25. United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1326 (1994); see, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir.) (dis-
tinguishing statements made by jurors themselves and statements from media or
other outside sources), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 483 (1993); Grooms v. Wainwright,
610 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir.) (distinguishing trial court's responsibilities in intra-
jury and extra-jury situations), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 953 (1980). For a further dis-
cussion on courts' treatment of intra-jury and extra-jury influences, see infra notes
24-40 and accompanying text.
26. Edwards, supra note 12, at 1522. He further discusses several instances of
jury misconduct and the common elements. Id. at 1526. He cites as common
elements, consideration by the jury of matters of the record, communications be-
tween third parties and jurors about matters of the case and pressures and partial-
ity on the part of the court. Id.; see, e.g., Resko, 3 F.3d at 689 (listing examples of
extra-jury misconduct); Gereau, 523 F.2d at 150 (listing types of extrajury influ-
ences); see also United States v. Bass, 10 F.3d 256, 256 (5th Cir. 1993) (alleging
jurors exposed to mid-trial newspaper account of the case); United States v. Ortiz-
Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 441 (1st Cir. 1993) (alleging misconduct when juror dis-
cussed case with daughter), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994); United States v.
Small, 891 F.2d 53, 54 (3d Cir. 1989) (alleging prejudice because transcript of
prejudicial sidebar shown to jury during deliberations); Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 1987) (alleging jury exposure to
extra-record information concerning facts of the case and defendant's past crimi-
nal record); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1209 (6th Cir. 1985) (alleg-
ing juror exposure to article about evidence excluded from hearing), cert. denied,
477 U.S. 906 (1986); United States v. Holman, 680 F.2d 1340, 1347 (lth Cir.
1982) (alleging jury exposure to publicity about defendant during the trial);
United States v. Herring, 568 F.2d 1099, 1105 (5th Cir. 1978) (allegingjury expo-
sure to mid-trial publicity about defendant); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d
1170, 1172 (3d Cir.) (alleging misconduct because news article reporting indict-
ment of a different person for same offense published during trial was viewed by
jurors), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 855 (1974); Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229 (3d Cir.
1973) (alleging juror misconduct because of likelihood that newspaper article
about defendant's retraction of guilty plea seen by jurors); Tillman v. United
1994] 1011
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Intrajury influences include: statements by jurors expressing an already
formed opinion about the outcome before evidence is presented, discus-
sion by the entire jury before the case is formally given to them for deliber-
ation and generalized knowledge held by the juror regarding the parties
or aspects of the case. 27
Extraneous jury influences pose more of a threat to an individual's
right to an impartial jury than do intra-jury influences.28 Extraneous in-
fluences render verdicts vulnerable because they are inconsistent with
Sixth Amendment guarantees. 29 When there are extraneous influences
upon jurors, there is a possibility that the jurors considered other informa-
tion when reaching a verdict. The possibility that the verdict was not
based on formally presented evidence but on outside information violates
the Sixth Amendment guarantees and prejudices the litigants.3 0 On the
other hand, intra-jury influences are less of a threat because no doubt
States, 406 F.2d 930, 937 (5th Cir.) (allegingjuror communication with third per-
son), vacated, 395 U.S. 830 (1969); United States v. Reynolds, 346 F.2d 253, 254
(7th Cir.) (alleging prejudicial publicity exposed to jurors), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
904 (1965).
27. See Drew v. Collins, 964 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1992) (holdingjuror con-
sideration of parole law during deliberation not outside influence), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 3044 (1993); United States v. Wiesner, 789 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986)
(alleging juror misconduct when jury discussed terminology prior to deliberation);
Grooms v. Wainwright, 610 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir.) (alleging juror misconduct
based on remark by juror overheard by defendant's mother), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
953 (1980); United States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 295 (1st Cir. 1979) (alleging
juror misconduct when juror made negative remark about defendant injury room
prior to formal deliberation); United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 978 (5th
Cir. 1978) (alleging juror misconduct when juror seen conversing with another
juror and two alternate jurors), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979).
28. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690. Extra-record influences, which include media, pub-
licity and communications with third persons, substantially threaten fairness be-
cause this type of information completely "evades the safeguards of the judicial
process." Id.; see also United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting well-established idea that extra-record influences pose substantial threat to
fairness of criminal proceeding because extraneous information evades safeguards
of judicial process).
29. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690.
30. Id. This possibility is evident from the procedures courts are required to
perform when there are extra-jury influences. In cases where the alleged juror
misconduct is based on an outside influence, courts are (1) either, required to
investigate as to what actually occurred and then determine if prejudicial, or (2)
there is an automatic presumption of prejudice when extra-influence is involved.
See United States v. Collins, 964 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1992) (setting forth pre-
sumption of prejudice when evidence of outside influence brought to court's at-
tention), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3044 (1993); United States v. Harris, 908 F.2d 728,
733 (11th Cir. 1990) (requiring courts to investigate allegations of extra-jury influ-
ences in order to determine occurrence of misconduct and prejudice), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1093 (1991); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 782 (2d Cir.) (holding
extra-record information presumptively prejudicial), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944
(1985); United States v. Doe, 513 F.2d 709, 711 (1st Cir. 1975) (declaring duty of
court to fully investigate and determine if prejudicial). But see United States v. Tier-
ney, 947 F.2d 854, 869 (8th Cir. 1991) (refusing to require mistrial when mis-
conduct allegation based on intra-jury influences); Chiantese, 582 F.2d at 978
1012 [Vol. 39: p. 1005
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arises that the jury based its decision on something other than the evi-
dence formally presented.3 1
B. Third Circuit's Treatment of Extra and Intra-Juiy Influences
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit specifically recognized the
doctrinal distinction between intra-jury influence and extra-jury influence
in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau.3 2 Most significantly, the court
held that extra-jury influences pose a greater threat to juror impartiality
than do intrajury influences.33 In Gereau, there were allegations that
while deliberating the jury was pressured by unauthorized communica-
tions.3 4 The court simply acknowledged the practical difference in jury
(distinguishing intra-influence situations from extra-jury influences and granting
court broad discretion to deal with allegation of prejudice).
31. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690. It is well-established that extra-jury influences pose a
more serious threat to the right to trial by an impartial jury. Id. In contrast with
intra-jury influences, little doubt exists that the jury based its decision only on the
evidence presented at trial. Id.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits seem to place more emphasis on the distinc-
tion than the other appellate courts. In United States v. Harris, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that alleged juror misconduct,
comprised of statements made that were not caused by some outside influence,
placed a lighter burden on the court to investigate. 908 F.2d 728, 733 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093 (1991). This lowered burden suggests that the
court is less concerned with prejudicial problems arising from intra-jury influ-
ences. Id. The Fifth Circuit declined to use the governing principles of outside
influence situations in cases where intra-jury influences were alleged. Chiantese,
582 F.2d at 978. The Fifth Circuit found that trial courts have greater discretion
when the alleged prejudicial misconduct was statements made by the jurors them-
selves. Grooms, 610 F.2d at 347. In addition, the Eighth Circuit has also stated that
normal jury pressures and intra-jury influences constitute no grounds for overturn-
ing verdicts. Tierney, 947 F.2d at 868.
Alternatively, a recent First Circuit decision seems to ignore any distinction
between intra-jury and extra-jury influences when determining how the courts
should investigate allegations ofjuror misconduct. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d at 442.
In Ortiz, it was alleged the daughter of ajuror, who had conversed with the defend-
ant's girlfriend, also discussed the case with her mother (the juror). Id. The
daughter further stated that she understood that the jurors as a whole had dis-
cussed the case prior to deliberating. Id. In reviewing the trial court's handling of
the allegations, the appellate court noted "when a non-frivolous suggestion is
made that a jury may be biased or tainted by some incident, the district court must
undertake an adequate inquiry to determine whether the alleged incident oc-
curred and if so, whether it was prejudicial." Id. The appellate court did not spe-
cifically distinguish between extra-jury and intra-jury incidents. It is feasible,
therefore, to conclude that this procedure of full investigation is warranted in both
instances.
32. 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976). Extra-
neous influences include exposure to media coverage about the case, considera-
tion by the jury of extra-record facts, communications between third parties and
jury members, and pressures on the part of the court. Id. The court noted that
these types of influences jeopardize Sixth Amendment rights. Id.
33. Id. In recognizing the threat of extra-jury influence, the court also noted
that jurors need not be totally ignorant about a case. Id. at 151.
34. Id. at 143.
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influences but failed to characterize this unauthorized communication as
an intra-jury or extrajury influence.3 5 In United States v. Thornton,3 6 the
court held jury apprehension was not caused by extra-jury influence and
no prejudice occurred.3 7 In finding that the jurors apprehension regard-
ing their safety was not an extra-jury influence, the court recognized and
discussed the distinct differences in extra-jury and intra-jury influences.38
Even though the Third Circuit recognized differences between intrajury
and extra-jury influences, they required the trial court to take the same
type of action when either type of prejudice was alleged.3 9 When either
intrajury or extra-jury influence are alleged the Third Circuit required the
trial court to adequately investigate the possible prejudice and develop a
record to determine whether actual prejudice exists as to the party.40
35. Id. In Gereau, the court dealt with post-verdict allegations that the verdict
resulted from certain "pressures from unauthorized communications." Id. The
court concentrated its analysis on whether the jury could impeach its verdict. Id. at
148. Within this analysis, the court pointed out the differences between the two
influences, but could not definitively classify the unauthorized communication as
either because there was a lack of specific findings at the trial court level. How-
ever, the court did find the unauthorized communications were not prejudicial to
the jury's determination. Id. at 152.
36. 1 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 483 (1993).
37. Id. at 155. The defendant, who had been convicted and sentenced on
several drug-related charges, sought a reversal and a new trial based on the court's
refusal to conduct voir dire of the jury after jurors expressed feelings of apprehen-
sion about their safety. Id. at 152. The record, four days into trial, notes that the
judge learned of the jurors' apprehension. Id. at 155. Subsequently, the judge
held a sidebar conference during which arrangements were made to transport the
jury in a van with tinted windows and bring them into the court room through a
back entrance. Id. In response to the defendant's request for voir dire, the court
stated that such apprehensions were normal and decided to treat the situation in a
low-key manner. Id. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. The appellate court stated that be-
cause jury apprehension was not extra-record information, the court was not re-
quired to investigate further. Id.
38. Id. While the court had determined that jury apprehension was not extra-jury influence, it did not classify such a situation as intra-jury influence. Id. In
categorizing the conduct, the court balanced the harm resulting from emphasizing
the misconduct and the gravity of the prejudice. Id.
39. United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1979).
40. Id. In Pantone, allegations ofjury prejudice concerned jury discussion and
premature formation of opinions. Id. The court held a corrective voir dire with all
jurors and decided that remarks made by jurors were inconsequential. Id. In af-
firming, the appellate court noted the promptness and thoroughness of the trial
court's investigation. Id. In United States v. Dowling, the defendant alleged the
jury had been exposed to extra-record evidence. 814 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 1987).
On review, the appellate court found that the trial court did not investigate the
allegation, and therefore, remanded for a new trial. Id. at 141.
From the holdings of these cases and others, it is evident that the Third Cir-
cuit requires trial courts to properly and thoroughly investigate both intra-jury and
extrajury influence situations. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's re-
quirements when jury misconduct and prejudice have been alleged, see infra notes
88-94, 115-21 & 138-44 and accompanying text.
1014 [Vol. 39: p. 1005
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Because parties are constitutionally entitled to a fair and impartial
jury, determining whether an incident prejudiced the jury is paramount in
protecting both Sixth and Seventh Amendment rights. 4 1 Prejudice is de-
fined as forejudgment, bias, partiality or a leaning towards one side of a
cause for some reason other than a conviction of its justice.42 Prejudice is
important in three respects. First, the amount of prejudice dictates
whether a new trial is required.43 Second, the amount of prejudice al-
leged dictates how the trial court will handle and investigate the matter.4
Third and most importantly, a trial court will only grant a new trial
when finding substantial prejudice in violation of the right to an impartial
jury.45 In determining whether sufficient prejudice existed in the minds
of the jurors, the court must first decide that sufficient prejudice is alleged
to warrant an investigation. Based on the facts of the inquiry, the court
then determines whether the level of prejudice justifies a new trial.46
When ascertaining the nature and extent of an allegation of preju-
dice, courts consider whether the claim of juror misconduct is actually
prejudicial to the litigants. In some instances, prejudice is presumed and
the trial court need not investigate the actual occurrence nor the nature
of the prejudice. When actual prejudice is assumed as a matter of law, the
burden shifts to the other party to prove the prejudice harmless.47 The
41. For a discussion of constitutional rights to a fair jury trial, see supra notes
1-10 and accompanying text.
42. BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1179 (6th ed. 1990).
43. For a discussion of the amount of prejudice required to grant a new trial,
see infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of what type of prejudice needs to be alleged before a
trial court will investigate, see infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
45. 66 CJ.S. New Trial § 47 (1950 & Supp. 1994). For a new trial to be
granted based on juror misconduct, such misconduct must relate to a material
matter and must be sufficient to cause bias or prejudice in the jury. Id. See Drew v.
Collins, 964 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that only jury misconduct
that deprives party of fair trial warrants new trial), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3044
(1993).
46. For a discussion of trial court investigation of allegations of prejudice, see
infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
47. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). The United States
Supreme Court creates a presumption of prejudice when jurors communicate with
third persons. Id. The presumption is not conclusive and the burden rests on the
government to establish that the third-party contact with the juror was harmless.
Id.
The Second Circuit not only created a presumption of prejudice for third-
party communications, but also found the presumption arises when any extra-rec-
ord information comes to the attention of the jurors., United States v. Weiss, 752
F.2d 777, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied; 474 U.S. 944 (1985). The court in Weiss affirm-
atively stated that extra-record information is presumptively prejudicial. Id. More-
over, the court stated the presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the
information was harmless. Id. at 783. See United States v. Doe, 513 F.2d 709, 711
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most common example of juror misconduct that creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption of prejudice is unauthorized juror communication with third
parties, witnesses or officials. 4a
Courts distinguish between extra-jury and intra-jury influences when
determining whether the prejudice alleged gives rise to a presumption of
prejudice, or whether no presumption can be made, requiring the alleg-
ing party prove a certain amount of prejudice. The likelihood of a pre-
sumption of prejudice in extra-jury information cases creates more of a
threat ofjury impartiality.49 Because there is a lesser threat of impartiality
in intra-jury influence cases, courts place the burden on the alleging party
to prove significant prejudice. 50 When a presumption of prejudice does
not arise, before the court will even investigate an allegation ofjuror prej-
udice there must be at least an affirmative reason to believe jury miscon-
duct occurred.51
In the Fourth Circuit, before the presumption of prejudice attaches, the de-
fendant must prove that unauthorized contact occurred and that it could reason-
ably draw into question the integrity of the verdict. Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d
740, 743 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). Once this threshold
has been proven, the government then bears the burden to show the absence of
prejudice. Id.; see Weiss, 752 F.2d at 782 (stating presumption of prejudice may be
rebutted by affirmative showing by government that information communicated
between juror and third party harmless).
48. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.
49. Drew, 964 F.2d at 415. The Fifth Circuit distinguished between intra-jury
influences and extra-jury influences in applying a presumption of prejudice. Id.
The Drew court stated that a presumption of prejudice arose when outside influ-
ence was brought to the court's attention. Id. However, if a defendant does not
allege that the jury was exposed to outside influence the presumption does not
arise, and the defendant must demonstrate the conduct violated constitutional
rights. Id.; see also United States v. Tierney, 947 F.2d 854, 869 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that intra-jury influences rather than extrajury influences constitute no
basis for overturning verdict); United States v. Harris, 908 F.2d 728, 733 (11th Cir.
1990) (declining to presume prejudice in all outside influence situations, instead
requiring investigation into matter, but applying no similar investigative require-
ment when intra-jury influence is alleged), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093 (1991).
50. Drew, 964 F.2d at 415. A presumption of prejudice can only arise in extra-
jury influence cases, therefore, when intrajury influences are alleged, the defend-
ant must prove that the jury misconduct violated constitutional rights. Id.
51. United States v. Herring, 568 F.2d 1099, 1104 (5th Cir. 1978). Counsel
brought to the attention of the court that extra-jury influences had reached the
jury. Id. The specific allegation stated that the jury might have been exposed to a
prejudicial newspaper article at some point during the trial. Id. at 1101. In re-
sponse, the court held that when extra-record information raises a serious ques-
tion of possible jury prejudice, the court must determine the likelihood that the
damaging material actually reached the jury. Id. at 1104-05.
In the past, courts imposed upon the defendant the burden of demonstrating
that news accounts read by the jury actually prejudiced the jury against him. Dog-
gett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 1973). Today, a defendant no longer
needs to show that the jury was actually prejudiced, rather a defendant must
merely demonstrate the likelihood that prejudicial material reached the jury. Id.
at 237; see United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing district court must make adequate inquiry into allegations of juror bias in or-
der to determine whether alleged incident occurred and whether prejudicial), cert.
1016 [Vol. 39: p. 1005
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D. Third Circuit's Treatment of Prejudice
The general rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit is that a case will be overturned and a new trial awarded only when
there is a sufficient showing that substantial prejudice to the party has oc-
curred.5 2 The Third Circuit also recognized a very limited presumption of
prejudice. In United States v. DAndrea,53 the Third Circuit stated that if
publicity is fundamentally prejudicial, actual prejudice is presumed as a
matter of law.54 Nevertheless, the court also found that when prejudice
does not arise as a matter of law, substantial prejudice must be proved to
warrant a mistrial.55
In United States v. Resko,5 6 the Third Circuit reaffirmed its narrow ap-
plication of a presumption of prejudice. 57 The Third Circuit refused to
apply a presumption of prejudice when the trial court failed to investigate
the nature and extent of pre-deliberations by the jury.58 The Third Cir-
cuit, in Waldorf v. Shuta,59 again refused to broaden the circumstances
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994); Drew, 964 F.2d at 415 (finding when no presumption
of prejudice arises, defendant must demonstrate jury misconduct prejudiced his or
her constitutional right);Jackson v. Amaral, 729 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1984) (requir-
ing jurors exposed to potentially prejudicial publicity during trial to be individually
questioned to ensure an impartial verdict in federal court).
The Eleventh Circuit created a test to determine what circumstances warrant
an investigation. United States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989, 997 (11th Cir. 1985).
When the allegations were more speculative and unsubstantiated, the court im-
plied a lesser burden to investigate. Id. at 998. However, in cases where more
serious potential jury prejudice occurs, the court imposed the heavy burden of
investigation. Id.
52. United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170, 1172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 855 (1974); see Doggett, 472 F.2d at 238 (affording defendant new trial because
substantial likelihood that news account came to attention of jurors).
A recent development in the Third Circuit allows a new trial even when the
party has not proved substantial prejudice. These cases deal with situations where
the trial court lacked in its solicitation of information as to whether prejudice ex-
ists. For a discussion of this exception, see infra notes 97-124 and accompanying
text.
53. 495 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 855 (1974).
54. Id. If prejudice is presumed as a matter of law, its mere occurrence re-
quires a mistrial. Id.; see Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (constitutionally,
trial by jury implies that evidence against defendant be developed in courtroom
where there is judicial protection of defendant's rights).
55. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d at 1172.
56. 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1326 (1994).
57. Id. at 695.
58. Id. The Resko court noted that when prejudice was presumed as a matter
of law, the alleged prejudice was so likely that an analysis into whether prejudice
occurred would be worthless. Id. The court then stated that it did not feel that
premature deliberations would lead to prejudice in every incident, and therefore
refused to apply a presumption of prejudice and required a full case analysis into
whether prejudice had occurred. Id. For a further discussion of United States v.
Resko, see infra notes 98-123 and accompanying text.
59. 3 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 1993).
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where the presumption of prejudice could be applied.60 The court also
refused to recognize a presumption of prejudice when the trial court
failed to uncover enough facts that would either support or reject a find-
ing of prejudice. 6 1
In the Third Circuit, when a presumption of prejudice does not ap-
ply, courts must investigate the nature and extent of possible prejudicial
conduct.62 The D'Andrea court noted that when the presumption does
not arise, courts must review the circumstances and order a new trial only
when substantial prejudice existed.63 The alleging party, therefore, has
the burden of showing a likelihood of actual prejudice.64
E. Trial Court Discretion
The trial court has the duty of protecting the rights of the parties and
ensuring an impartial jury trial. 65 In cases where prejudice has been al-
leged based on possible jury misconduct, the trial court has the discretion
to determine (1) the extent and nature of the investigation and (2)
whether substantial prejudice occurred to warrant remedial action. 66
60. Id. at 710. The court found the circumstances of this case were not strong
enough to warrant a presumption of prejudice as a matter of law. Id. at n.6.
61. For a detailed discussion of Waldorf v. Shuta, see infra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
62. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d at 1172.
63. Id.
64. United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1979); see United
States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.) (stating appellants have burden of
showing likelihood of actual prejudice), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085 (1984).
In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, the court recognized a pref-
erence for individual questioning ofjurors when there was a "significant possibility
that a juror has been exposed to prejudicial extra-record information." 814 F.2d
134, 137 (3d Cir. 1987). The Dowling court noted that where there is an affirma-
tive reason to believe ajury member's exposure to extra-record information exists,
it is the court's duty to determine whether the trial should be aborted or whether
the jury can render an impartial verdict. Id. at 138.
65. Patton v. United States 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); see United States v. Ortiz-
Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating when jury may be biased court
must undertake adequate inquiry to determine whether it was prejudicial to party),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994); Dowling, 814 F.2d at 138 (recognizing trial
court's duty to determine whether mistrial appropriate or whether jury can remain
impartial); United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1144 (6th Cir. 1985) (stat-
ing trial court's duty to investigate and determine whether violation of Sixth
Amendment occurred when juror misconduct alleged), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1119
(1986); Monk, supra note 3, at 1070 (holding trial judge responsible for ensuring
Sixth Amendment guarantee of impartial jury).
66. United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 629 (2d Cir. 1985). In Aiello, the
Second Circuit stated that wide discretion is given to a judge to decide on the
appropriate investigation to make. Id. The method of investigating and the extent
of the investigation depends on the surrounding circumstances. Id. Because the
trial judge views the conduct of the parties and the jurors, broad discretion is given
to decide on a course of action. Id. The court lists several types of methods the
judge may employ. Id. These include questioning the juror in open court, or a
private inquiry in the robing room. Id.; see Ortiz-Arnigoitia, 996 F.2d at 443 (recog-
1018
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F. Third Circuit's Recognition of Trial Court Discretion
The Third Circuit recognized that the trial court has discretion in
dealing with allegations of juror misconduct carrying the possibility of
prejudice. 6 7 This discretion applies both to the court's decision concern-
ing how to handle an allegation ofjury misconduct, and the court's deter-
mination as to whether sufficient prejudice has been demonstrated. 68
The Third Circuit, in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling,6 9 set forth
reasoning for the broad discretion granted to the trial court.70 First, be-
cause the judge creates a relationship with the jury and is closer to the
actual facts, the trial judge is in a better position than an appellate court to
measure what a situation requires.71 On appeal, because of the broad dis-
cretion given to the trial court in juror misconduct cases, there is a limited
standard of review.
G. Standard of Review
In juror misconduct cases, the standard of review at the appellate
court level is abuse of discretion. 72 To determine if the trial court abused
nizing within duty to investigate, court has discretion to construct any appropriate
and responsible procedure to determine whether jury prejudice exists); United
States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1985) (recognizing discretion oftrial court in its choice of investigation procedures when investigating juror mis-
conduct); United States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 295 (lst Cir. 1979) (recognizing
trial court's discretion to choose extent and type of investigation); United States v.
Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir. 1978) (recognizing trial court's discretion
concerning decision on whether hearing necessary to determine juror miscon-
duct), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979); see also United States v. Bass, 10 F.3d 256,
256 (5th Cir. 1993). The court held that the trial court had discretion to deter-
mine whether the publicity during the trial was so prejudicial as to require a mis-
trial. Id.; see United States v. Harris, 908 F.2d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 1990)
(recognizing discretion of trial court in deciding on investigation procedure and
whether misconduct occurred that prejudiced defendant), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1093 (1991); Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 938 (5th Cir.) (recognizing
discretion of trial court to grant new trial injury misconduct cases includes discre-
tion to determine type and extent of investigation), vacated, 395 U.S. 830 (1969).
67. Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152. The court respected the discretion of the trial
court because the trial court is in a better position to observe the impact of the
premature deliberations. Id.
68. Id.; seeUnited States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641,667 (3d Cir. 1993) (recogniz-
ing both prongs of trial court's discretion); United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 689
(3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing two prongs of trial court's discretion in cases involving
both intra- and extra-jury misconduct), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1326 (1994).
69. 814 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987).
70. Id. at 137.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1984); see United
States v. Bass, 10 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing abuse of discretion
standard important because trial court in best position to make determinations);
United States v. Wiesner, 789 F.2d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing appel-
late court must review trial court decision under abuse of discretion standard);
United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding stan-
dard of review of investigation of jury misconduct is abuse of discretion), cert. de-
1994] 1019
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its discretion, the appellate court considers whether the trial court's deci-
sion was based on a consideration of the relevant factors, and whether
there was a clear error of judgment.73
The appellate court finds that the trial court abused its discretion
only when the trial judge does not investigate the allegations of jury mis-
conduct and prejudice in a manner that would discover (1) whether the
alleged misconduct actually occurred and (2) whether the misconduct
had any prejudicial effect.74 When the trial court fails to fully investigate
the allegations, the court's decision about the existence of prejudice is not
based on actual facts, and the appellate court will find abuse of
discretion. 75
In order to avoid abuse of discretion, some appellate courts set forth
procedures that the trial court must follow when investigating juror mis-
conduct. 76 The procedure set forth by the Third Circuit requires an inves-
nied, 476 U.S. 1119 (1986); Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 938 (5th Cir.)
(stating that trial court decision can only be reversed when discretion abused),
vacated, 395 U.S. 830 (1969).
73. Soulard, 730 F.2d at 1296. It is recognized that even though trial courts
have broad discretion to determine the extent and the nature of the investigation
into juror bias allegations, it is not unlimited discretion. United States v. Corbin,
590 F.2d 398, 400 (1st Cir. 1979); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (applying abuse of discretion standard), ovenued by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
74. Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1071 (1989). The trial court failed to make factual findings on the critical
questions of whether the alleged misconduct actually occurred and whether it was
prejudicial. Id.; see United States v. Chiantese, 583 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1978)
(failure to hold hearing when outside influences on jury alleged abuse of discre-
tion and reversible error), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979). But see Bass, 10 F.3d at
260 (no abuse of discretion because trial judge conducted careful, face-to-face
uestioning ofjurors); United States v. Armstrong, 909 F.2d 1238, 1244 (9th Cir.)
no abuse of discretion because trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and
extensively questioned jurors), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 870 (1990); United States v.
Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1979) (no abuse of discretion because trial
judge immediately held corrective voir dire).
75. United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1326 (1994). Requiring the trial court to decide if the alleged jury misconduct
occurred, and then determine whether it was prejudicial, creating a record on
which to base a decision about whether prejudice existed. Id.; see United States v.
Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 294-95 (1st Cir. 1979) (utilizing same approach as Third
Circuit).
76. The United States Courts of Appeals in the First Circuit requires the trial
court to undertake a full investigation to determine whether the alleged incident
actually occurred and whether it was prejudicial when a suggestion is made that a
jury may be biased by some incident. United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d
436, 442 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994). With this requirement
the trial judge still has the discretion to choose the specific method of inquiry so
long as the requirement of thoroughness is met. Id. at 443; see United States v.
Anello, 765 F.2d 253, 258 (1st Cir.) (meeting requirements of adequate investiga-
tion when judge investigated promptly and thoroughly and made specific fact find-
ings about specific misconduct and its effects), cert denied, 474 U.S. 996 (1985);
Jackson v. Amaral, 729 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1984) (findingjudge adequately inves-
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tigation into the extent and nature of the actual occurrence of the
misconduct and the existence of prejudice.
III. RECENT THIRD CIRCUIT DECISIONS
The Third Circuit recently considered the above four factors: extra
and intra-jury influences, prejudice, discretion and standard of review and
set forth when it was appropriate for the appellate court to grant a mistrial
injury misconduct cases.77 Under this approach, a new trial is warranted
when the trial court failed to thoroughly investigate the allegations ofjury
misconduct to determine whether prejudice occurred.78 In Government of
tigated allegation of prejudice when jurors were questioned about effect miscon-
duct had on their attitudes).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit requires trial
courts to conduct an adequate investigation when there are allegations of possible
prejudicial extra-record influences. United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 783 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). The trial judge must assess the possibility of
prejudice by reviewing the entire record, analyzing the substance of the extrinsic
evidence and comparing it to the information which jurors were properly aware.
Id.
The appellate courts in the Seventh Circuit require trial courts to follow a
specific procedure when prejudicial publicity is brought to the courts attention.
Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833
(1969). First, the trial court must ascertain if the jury members were exposed to
the outside material. Id. at 735. Then the trial court must individually question
those who have been exposed in order to determine the effect the material had on
juror impartiality. Id. If no one admits to seeing the publicity, then the trial judge
is not required to proceed further. Id.
The Fifth Circuit also requires certain procedures when prejudicial publicity
comes to the court's attention. United States v. Herring, 568 F.2d 1099, 1104 (5th
Cir. 1978). The judge must first focus on the nature of the publicity and deter-
mine whether it raises a serious possibility of prejudice. Id. Factors to consider in
assessing whether there is possible prejudice include the relation of the article to
the case at hand and the timing of the publication of the article. Id. at 1105. If the
court determines the jury is possibly prejudiced, then the court must determine
the likelihood the material reached the jury. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit creates a spectrum for deciding
whether the trial court should investigate allegations of jury misconduct. United
States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1985). If allegations are speculative
and unsubstantiated then there is a lesser burden on the trial court to investigate.
Id. On the other hand, the trial court has a heavier burden to investigate more
serious allegations of potential jury bias. Id. See United States v. Harris, 908 F.2d
728, 733-34 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing spectrum and duty to investigate), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1093 (1991).
77. Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 706 (3d Cir. 1993). The court remanded for
a new trial because of inadequate investigation of alleged jury misconduct. Id.
The Third Circuit also allowed a new trial in United States v. Resko, because the
trial court failed to inquire about the extent and nature of the jury misconduct. 3
F.3d at 686.
This practice of allowing a new trial when the trial court fails to develop an
adequate record about the alleged jury misconduct was first practiced in Govern-
ment of Virgin Islands v. Dowling. 814 F.2d 134, 137-38, 141 (3d Cir. 1987).
78. Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 706. Each of the cases discussed allow a new trial based
solely on the ground that the trial court did not adequately investigate. Because of
the trial court's failure to investigate, there was not enough information for either
1994] 1021
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the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, United States v. Resko and Waldorf v. Shuta, the
Third Circuit developed specific circumstances granting a new trial when
there was a lack of information before the appellate court to determine
the absence or presence of prejudice.
A. First Case Treatment: Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling
In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, the Third Circuit first
determined that a new trial was warranted when there was insufficient in-
formation to determine the absence or presence of prejudice. 79 During
the trial, the trial judge learned from ajuror that another juror admitted
to knowing about the facts of the case and about Dowling's past criminal
record. 80 The trial judge refused to question each juror individually to
determine whether and to what extent the juror had influenced the other
jurors.8 1 Instead, the trial judge asked the members of the jury collectively
whether they had been exposed to any information that would render
them unable to provide a fair trial for the defendant.82 Because none of
the jurors admitted to being exposed to information that would affect
their judgment, the judge denied Dowling's motion for a mistrial.8 3
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Dowling argued that his right to a fair
trial was violated because the trial court failed to conduct a thorough and
individual investigation of each jury member and make an informed deci-
sion about the existence of prejudice.8 4 The Third Circuit first noted that
in situations where there was a "significant possibility" that ajuror was sub-
ject to prejudicial extra-record information, the preference was to individ-
the trial court or the appellate court to be able to make an accurate determination
about the prejudice the jury misconduct caused. For a further discussion of these
cases, see infra notes 79-95, 97-124, & 125-144 and accompanying text.
79. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 134. Dowling was arrested and charged with federal
offenses in connection with a robbery of the First Pennsylvania Bank. Id. at 135.
Because the first jury was hung, a second trial was held. Id.
80. Id. This information was considered extra-record because it came from
an outside source and not from a juror himself. Id. During the trial, a morning
edition of the St. Croix Avis contained an article about Dowling that revealed Dow-
ling's previous bank robbery conviction and acquittal of a shooting death. Id. at
135-36. At this point, defense counsel asked the judge to determine if the jury had
been exposed to the article and to admonish the jury regarding avoidance of me-
dia coverage of the trial. Id. at 136. The judge did question the jury collectively
about exposure to the article, and when he received no affirmative reply, he simply
reminded them to ignore publicity of the facts of the case. Id.
Before closing arguments were given, the issue of exposure to extra-record
information was again raised. Id. The judge received a note from an alternate
juror that one of the jurors had admitted to seeing and reading news accounts of
the trial, and that this juror knew of Dowling's other crimes. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. The jury was to answer this question by raising their juror's card. Id.
83. Id. at 137.
84. Id. at 137-38. Faced with the second allegation of jury misconduct, thejudge notified counsel and the three agreed to excuse the juror who admitted to
having extra-record knowledge of the case. Id. at 136.
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ually question the "possibly-tainted juror."85 Individual questioning was
preferred because it was a more effective means to discover latent
prejudices of thejurors.8 6 Moreover, the court noted that trial courts have
broad discretion in conducting voir dire and determining whether actual
prejudice exists; therefore, the appellate court can overturn a trial court's
decision only when there is an abuse of discretion.8 7
Although the Third Circuit recognized and respected the discretion
of the trial judge, the court held that the information gathered by the trial
judge was "insufficient to permit him to fulfill his responsibilities" in pro-
tecting the defendant's right to an impartial jury.8 8 The Third Circuit
specifically stated that in order to protect this right, the trial court must
determine whether the jury is partial or impartial.8 9 This determination is
often based on whether the juror can set aside his own opinions and
render a fair verdict.90 The Third Circuit stated that when the trial court
decides whether a juror's statement of impartiality is believable, the trial
court must discover what extra-record information was conveyed and the
manner in which it was conveyed. 91
According to the Third Circuit, the trial court's failure to determine
pertinent evidence about the extra-record information created an ineffec-
tual record for determining whether prejudice existed.92 Because the trial
85. Id. at 137. The court also felt it was too much to expect a juror to come
forward in front of a collective group especially when they failed to report the
information to the trial judge. Id.; see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Rosado,
699 F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir.) (expressing Third Circuit's preference for individual
voir dire), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d
1170, 1173 n.8 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 855 (1974); Doggett v. Ye-
ager, 472 F.2d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 1973) (same).
86. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 137.
87. Id. Trial courts are in a better position to measure what a situation re-
quires. Id. For a detailed discussion of trial court's discretion, see supra notes 65-
70 and accompanying text.
88. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 137. It is important to note that the Third Circuit
does not require a specific procedure; however, if a judge does investigate he must
do so in a way that will help the court determine the absence or presence of preju-
dice. Id. at 138. The court refused to rule out the possibility that collective ques-
tioning would have revealed the necessary information. Id. For a further
discussion of the trial court's duty to protect the party's right to an impartial and
fair jury, see supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
89. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 139.
90. Id. For a discussion ofjuror impartiality and the standard of impartiality,
see supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
91. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 139. In order to determine the type and exact infor-
mation that was conveyed and the manner of conveyance, the trial court must
"determine on the record precisely what happened." Id. at 140.
The Third Circuit, however, does note that failure to discover what informa-
tion was conveyed and the manner it was received is not always reversible error. Id.
at 139 n.2.
92. Id. at 140. The court held that the trial court's failure to conduct a voir
dire and the inability to speculate about the jurors' responses create the situation
where Dowling must be given a new trial. Id.
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court lacked information to make a sufficient evaluation of possible juror
prejudice, the Third Circuit determined that a new trial must be afforded
to Dowling.93 In conclusion, the Third Circuit stated that the trial court
should have collected more information to determine the possibility of
prejudice because there was a "strong probability that the jury had been
exposed to extra-record information with the potential for substantial [u-
ror prejudice."9 4
The holding in Dowling is very limited. It applies to situations where
(1) there is extra-record information, (2) there is a strong suggestion that
the jury was in contact with this information and (3) the information is
itself serious and strong.95 Recently, the Third Circuit expanded this
holding to some degree in United States v. Resko.96
B. The Next Step-United States v. Resko
The Third Circuit in United States v. Resko took the holding in Dowling
one step further and actually created an exception to the general rule.
97
Under the general rule, in order for an appellate court to grant a new
trial, the defendant must show that the trial court's error was prejudicial. 98
The exception requires convictions to be vacated and a new trial ordered
when jury misconduct is discovered during trial, and there is no way for
the appellate court to determine whether prejudice originally existed. 99
In Resko, the defendants were indicted for conspiring to distribute
more than five kilograms of cocaine and more than one kilogram of her-
oin.100 Additionally they were indicted for unlawful carry and use of a
firearm.1 01 Two of the three defendants went to trial, and the judge be-
93. Id. at 141. Instead of creating a record from questioning the jury, and
deciding the issue of potential prejudice from this record, the trial court, in effect,
adopted a procedure which transferred the responsibility of determining imparti-
ality to the jury. Id. This occurred when the court asked the jury collectively
whether they could render a fair decision without first discovering whether they
were even exposed to the prejudicial information. Id.
94. Id. at 140.
95. Id.
96. 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 1993). For a full discussion of the holding in Resko, see
infra notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
97. Resko, 3 F.3d at 686.
98. Id.
99. Id. The appellate court's inability to determine whether the defendant
was prejudiced usually occurs when the trial court failed to fully investigate and
develop a record of what actually occurred. Id. at 694. In these situations, the
party will be granted a new trial without having to establish prejudice. Id. For a
discussion of the limited situations where this exception applies, see infra notes
123-24 and accompanying text.
100. Resko, 3 F.3d at 687. They were charged with violating 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841 (a) (1)-(a) (2), 846, 924(c)(1) (1988). Resko, 3 F.3d at 687. The case in-
volved a drug bust of New York City suppliers who were attempting to infiltrate the
Pittsburgh market for illegal drugs. Id. at 686.
101. Id. at 687.
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gan the trial by admonishing the jurors not to discuss the case until all the
evidence had been presented and they were formally given instructions.10 2
During the seventh day of a nine-day trial, a juror told a court officer
that the members of the jury had been discussing the case during their
recess and while waiting in the jury room.'0 3 The court officer informed
the trial judge, who then informed counsel. 10 4 The district judge refused
to question the jurors individually; instead, the judge called the jurors to-
gether and had them answer a written questionnaire. 0 5 All twelve jurors
admitted to having discussed the case, but all twelve denied having formed
an opinion as to the defendants' guilt or innocence.' 06 At this point, the
defendants moved for a further inquiry or in the alternative a mistrial.' 0 7
The trial court denied both of the defendants' motions.' 0 8
Upon conviction, the defendants appealed the district court's investi-
gation of juror misconduct and the court's denial of a mistrial.' 0 9 The
Third Circuit first addressed the importance of not allowing a jury to dis-
cuss the case before they have heard evidence presented by both sides and
the legal instructions of the court." 0 The court then focused on the
102. Id. The judge also continued to admonish the jury during the trial as
well. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. At this point the defendants moved for an individual investigation of
the jurors concerning what had occurred and the extent of any prejudice, and in
the alternative for a mistrial. Id. at 687-88.
105. Id. at 688. Before distributing the questionnaire, the court made an
opening statement to the jury about the discovery of the allegation of juror mis-
conduct and the need for the answers to the questions in order to insure an impar-
tial verdict. Id. at n.2. The questionnaire presented two questions to the jury
members. Id. at 688. One, whether the jurors had participated in discussing the
facts of the case with other jurors. Id. Two, whether the juror had formed an




109. Id. The Third Circuit has jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1988). Resko, 3 F.3d at 688.
110. Resko, 3 F.3d at 688. The rule against pre-deliberation is firmly estab-
lished in federal court practice. Id. at 689. Federal courts have developed a prac-
tice of admonishing the jury not to discuss the case as a preventive measure. Id.
The court set forth six reasons why a jury should not discuss the case before
formal deliberations. Id. First, because the prosecution presents evidence first any
discussion or opinions formed at this point would likely be unfavorable to the de-
fendant. Id. Second, once a juror has expressed an opinion it is more likely that
the juror will adhere to that decision and consciously look for evidence to support
the preconceived opinion. Id. Third, pre-deliberation may frustrate the goal of
the jury system to involve collective deliberate decisionmaking. Id. Fourth, pre-
discussions are held without the help of the legal instructions and standards
presented by the court at the end of the trial. Id. Fifth, premature discussions
and formation of opinions that occur before the defendant has presented evi-
dence have the effect of shifting the burden of proof from the government to the
defendant. Id. Finally, refusing to allow pre-deliberation helps protect Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial as well as due process rights. Id. at 689-90.
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doctrinal distinction between intra-jury and extra-jury influences on the
jury.1 11 The court also emphasized the broad discretion of trial courts in
handling investigations of alleged jury misconduct and in determining
prejudice. 112
The Third Circuit discussed the competing considerations of granting
the trial court discretion in determining whether prejudice occurred,
while enforcing the rules against pre-deliberation. 113 After weighing these
considerations, the court pointed out its true concern, the lack of a record
or any evidence that would help determine whether the discussions actu-
ally caused prejudice to the defendants.' 14
The Resko court noted its concern over the district court's failure to
investigate the nature and the extent of the discussions because (1) the
district court's ability to evaluate the existence of prejudice was dimin-
ished by the lack of information and (2) the appellate court's ability to
review the trial court's decision was also frustrated by the lack of informa-
tion. 115 Because of the insufficient record and other related concerns, the
Third Circuit held that the investigation by the trial court was inade-
quate. 116 Specifically, the Third Circuit determined that the trial court
was unable to fulfill its responsibility to determine whether prejudice
existed. 117
The Third Circuit places importance on preventing pre-deliberation and rec-
tifying the situation when it has occurred. Nevertheless, other circuits do not.
111. Id. at 690. Based on the definitions of intrajury influence and extrajury
influence discussed above, the juror misconduct which occurred in this case was
intra-jury influence. Id. For a discussion of intra and extrajury influences, see
supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
112. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690. The court noted that the same discretion exists for
allegations ofjuror misconduct whether it be intrajury or extra-jury influence. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The appellate court has no evidence about the nature of the jury's
discussions and whether these discussions created prejudice. Id.
115. Id. at 691. The court failed to investigate the nature of the discussions-
whether they were brief or full-blown-as well as the extent of the discussions-
whether they occurred once or several times during the trial. Id. at 690-91. The
court was also concerned about the reliability of the written answers received by
the trial court. Id. at 691. When the questionnaires were filled out, court person-
nel were not present and the situation presented the opportunity for collaboration
on the part of the jurors. Id.
For a discussion of the trial court's responsibility to determine whether preju-
dice actually existed, see supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the appellate court's standard of review in juror misconduct cases, see supra
notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
116. Resko, 3 F.3d at 691.
117. Id. The court's decision in Resko was consistent with the decision in Dow-
ling. In both Resko and Dowling, the Third Circuit determined that the trial court's
failure to investigate fully the allegations of prejudice and only allowing the juror
to answer questions about their impartiality had the effect of giving the jury the
responsibility of determining whether prejudice existed. Id. at 691-92.
For a discussion of the Dowling court's decision, see supra notes 79-95 and
accompanying text.
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In granting a new trial because of the trial court's failure to properly
investigate the allegation ofjuror misconduct, the Third Circuit specified
the correct procedures that should be applied. a18 When jury misconduct
is alleged, including intra-jury influence, the district court should deter-
mine whether the misconduct actually occurred, and if so whether it was
prejudicial.1 19 In so holding, the Third Circuit refused to recognize a pre-
sumption of prejudice when the trial court fails to fully investigate the
alleged juror misconduct and determine whether prejudice exists.1 20 The
Resko court created an exception where a new trial is granted without the
defendant first establishing that prejudice existed.121
The exception created by the court in Resko applies when jury miscon-
duct has been alleged regardless of whether it was misconduct caused by
improper intrajury influences or improper extra-jury influences.1 2 2 This
represents an expansion of the decision reached in Dowling, granting a
new trial only in cases where allegations of improper extra-jury influence
were not properly investigated by the trial court.123
There is one more recent case which supports the Third Circuit's pol-
icy requiring (1) the trial court to first determine whether the allegedju-
ror misconduct occurred and then decide whether it was prejudicial and
(2) the appellate court to render a new trial in the absence of this
procedure. 12 4
C. Final Support-Waldorf v. Shuta
The Third Circuit reviewed a civil trial where the defendants alleged
prejudicial jury misconduct in Waldorf v. Shuta 2 5 The plaintiff, Waldorf,
was diagnosed as a C6-C7 level quadriplegic as the result of an automobile
accident in the Borough of Kenilworth.12 6 He filed suit against the drivers
of the other vehicles, as well as the Borough and Borough officials. 12 7
118. Resko, 3 F.3d at 691.
119. Id.; see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 141
(3d Cir. 1987) (requiring investigation of actual occurrence of alleged juror mis-
conduct and determination of whether it was prejudicial); United States v. Rich-
man, 600 F.2d 286, 295 (1st Cir. 1979) (same). But see United States v. Clapps, 732
F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.) (upholding trial court's decision concerning whether
prejudice existed because court individually questioned each juror and conducted
adequate investigation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085 (1984); United States v. Pan-
tone, 609 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1979) (same).
120. Resko, 3 F.3d at 695.
121. Id. at 694.
122. Id. at 691.
123. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 140-41.
124. Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 1993).
125. Id. at 706.
126. Id.
127. Id. The first trial resulted in a jury verdict of $8.4 million for Waldorf.
Id. On appeal to the Third Circuit, the verdict was reversed and remanded. Id. at
706-07. See Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1990) for the reasons for
reversal. Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 706-07 (3d Cir. 1993) On remand the case
1994] 1027
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The evening before closing arguments were to be made on the issue
of damages, an area news station reported a damage award of thirty-mil-
lion dollars to a quadriplegic plaintiff in New York. 128 The report also
included footage of the victim performing routine tasks with the help of
another. 129 A newspaper account of the award was also in the evening and
morning newspapers.130
Counsel for the defendant brought the situation to the attention of
the court.1 3 ' The district judge immediately questioned the jurors as a
group to determine whether any of the members had been exposed to the
coverage.' 3 2 Two jurors indicated seeing the news report, a third juror
stated he had read about the case and award in a local paper, while a
fourth juror commented that the jury had "[niot really" discussed the New
York award among themselves. 133 With these answers, the district judge
then questioned individually each juror who had indicated knowledge of
the New York damage award.' 3 4 From the answers of these jury members,
there was evidence that a news account of the damage award was in the
was bifurcated on the issues of liability and damages, and the jury first heard evi-
dence on the issue of damages. Id. at 707. The Third Circuit discussed certain
alleged juror misconduct that occurred during this portion of the trial. Id.
128. Waldorf 3 F.3d at 707. The plaintiff was diagnosed as a quadriplegic as a
result of a school shooting. Id.
129. Id. The footage entitled "a day in the life" showed the victim being fed
cereal by an attendant, while a reporter stated that he was paralyzed from the neck
down, and reported the $30 million damage award as a fortune. Id. This footage
was exactly the type of information the trial judge in the Waldorf case refused as
inadmissible. Id. at 707. The Borough had attempted to produce testimony from
three quadriplegics with functional capabilities comparable to the plaintiff's. Id.
The court ruled that evidence relating to other quadripligics was inadmissible. Id.
130. Id. This type of alleged jury misconduct falls within improper extrajury
influences. For a discussion of why media is an extra-jury influence, see supra
notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
131. Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 707. This case is distinguishable from Dowling and
Resko discussed in this casebrief. Dowling, as well as Resko, dealt with situations
where ajuror had brought forth evidence or allegations ofjuror misconduct. For
a discussion of the impact of this difference, see infra notes 142-44 and accompany-
ing text.
132. Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 707. The court asked the jury collectively whether they
had seen the television coverage of the damage award in New York. Id. The judge
also asked whether the New York damage award had been discussed among the
jurors. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 707-08. The questions the judge asked the four jurors who had
indicated knowledge of the large damage award concerned what information they
knew about the case, the source of this information, whether the case had been
discussed among jury members, and whether the jurors felt they could remain
impartial. Id. at 708-09. This is also another distinguishing point from Resko and
Dowlingwhere the trial judge did not question any of the jurors individually. For a
discussion of the impact of this difference, see infra note 144 and accompanying
text.
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jury room and that remarks about the award were made in front of other
jury members.1 3 5
The district court reserved its decision on the jury misconduct issue
until the jury returned a verdict.13 6 Following a verdict in excess of six-
teen-million dollars for Waldorf, the Borough renewed a motion for mis-
trial that was denied.13 7
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit stressed the importance of
a fair, impartial jury trial.' 38 The court emphasized, however, that the ap-
pellants have the burden of proving prejudice, and it is the appellate
court's duty to determine whether the Borough met this burden based on
the record set before them.13 9 The Third Circuit, after reviewing the con-
versations between the trial judge and the four jurors, held that this infor-
mation suggested possible prejudice, but there was insufficient evidence to
determine whether actual prejudice existed.140 The trial court's error oc-
curred when the judge failed to question the remainder of the jury mem-
bers to determine whether they had been exposed to the extra-record
information.' 4 '
After Waldorf, the Third Circuit's resolve to allow new trials when the
trial court conducts an inadequate investigation of the alleged juror mis-
conduct not only applies to intra-jury and extra-jury situations, but now
applies to civil cases as well as criminal cases. 14 2 Although the Third Cir-
cuit in Waldorf did not mention the exception created in Resko, it can be
assumed that because the exception applies to the less threatening situa-
tion of intra-jury influences, it also applies to the more harmful extra-jury
135. Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 708-09.
136. Id. at 709.
137. Id.
138. Id. It also noted that it is the trial court's duty to determine whether a
jury can be impartial and unprejudiced and if the jury can confine its decision to
record evidence. Id. For a discussion of the importance of an impartial jury trial,
see supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
139. Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 710. For a discussion of the role prejudice plays injury
misconduct cases, see supra notes 41-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the appellate court's review of trial courts' decision of whether prejudice ex-
isted, see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
140. Waldorf 3 F.3d at 710-11. The court again refused to create a presump-
tion of prejudice when the trial court fails to adequately investigate allegations of
jury misconduct. Id. at 710. For a discussion of situations where there is a pre-
sumption of prejudice, see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
141. Waldorf 3 F.3d at 711. It is unclear whether the three jurors who were
not questioned were indirectly exposed to the extra-record information because
there was evidence that an account of the large damage award was in the jury
room. Id. There is also no way to determine if anything was said or who was
listening, and therefore, it is impossible to determine the extent of the entire jury's
exposure. Id.




Walthall: Constitutional Law - The Practical and Procedural Implications of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
influences. 143 The court's decision in Waldorf also seems to suggest that
the trial court must not only adequately investigate extra-record informa-
tion specifically about the trial, but also review any extra-record informa-
tion that goes to. the merits of the case. 144
IV. PRACIONER POINTERS
Several situations now exist where a practioner in the Third Circuit
can argue for a mistrial when juror misconduct has been alleged during
trial. The first is the longstanding general rule that an appeal for a mis-
trial should be argued when the party can show substantial prejudice from
the jury's conduct.1 45
The remainder of the situations are exceptions to this general rule.
The practioner can appeal for a mistrial when the trial court in a criminal
case involving extra-record information fails to investigate the nature and
extent of the jury's exposure to determine whether it was prejudicial, or
allow the appellate court to make that determination. 146 The next situa-
tion involves a criminal case where there is improper intra-jury influences
and the trial court again fails to adequately investigate the allegations of
juror misconduct. 14 7 The third opportunity to appeal for a mistrial occurs
in civil jury trials where the trial court inadequately investigates allegations
of juror misconduct. 148
V. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit considered (1) the distinctions between intrajury
and extra-jury influences, (2) situations where there is a presumption of
prejudice and (3) the discretion of the trial court to handle allegations of
jury misconduct.14 9 The court concluded that when the trial court fails to
investigate and create a record about the actual occurrence, and the ex-
tent and nature of mid-trial jury misconduct, there is no basis for either
the trial court or the appellate court to make an accurate finding about
143. For a discussion of the differences in intra-jury and extrajury influences
and the threats each pose, see supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
144. Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 707. In this case, the jury did not read any material
specific to the trial they were sitting on, but on the other hand, they were exposed
to general information about the physical capabilities of a quadriplegic. Id.
145. For a further discussion of the general rule, see supra note 98 and ac-
companying text.
146. For a discussion of this exception, see the discussion of Government of
Virgin Islands v. Dowling, see supra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of the second exception, see the discussion of United
States v. Resko, see supra notes 97-124 and accompanying text.
148. For a discussion of the final exception, see the discussion of Waldorf v.
Shuta, see supra notes 125-44 and accompanying text.
149. For a further discussion of Third Circuit's discussion of this element, see
supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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the existence of prejudice.15 0 When this occurs, it is appropriate for the
appellate court to grant a new trial.
It is important to note that there is not a presumption of prejudice
when this occurs, but that a new trial is granted because of inadequate
information.1 51 Furthermore, even though the Third Circuit stated that
there must be an adequate and thorough investigation, it does not set
forth any specific procedures for the trial court to follow. Instead the
method of investigation is still within the discretion of the trial court.
By requiring a detailed factual record for the determination of preju-
dice, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sets forth a
policy that more thoughtfully protects the rights of individuals to a fair
and impartial jury.
Elise E. Walthall
150. For a discussion of the development of this idea, see supra notes 80-144
and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reluctance to create a presump-
tion of prejudice, see supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
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